Paper
The Placebo and the Clinical Trial by James Parkhouse mD FFA RCS (Nuffield Department ofAnasthetics, Radcliffe Infirmary, Oxford) Earlier in this year Dr Holmes and I presented to this Section of the Royal Society of Medicine a study of post-operative pain in which. a placebo was used (Parkhouse & Holmes 1963) . I pleaded on that occasion that the design of the study should not be taken to imply support for the use of a placebo whenever a clinical trial is carried out. Today I wish to amplify my views on the role of the placebo in the controlled clinical trial.
It seems almost unbelievable that as recently as 1945 the American physician Perry Pepper found himself unable to discover any specific reference to the placebo in medical literature. He felt that it deserved at least one article to itself and decided to write one: had the result not been so intrinsically entertaining he need not have bothered, for it is now almost impossible to keep track of all that has been said and written on the placebo by workers in many fields of medicine and psychology. People, of course, may say and write what they like; but when the placebo begins to appear in our anesthetic journals and researchas it will do increasingly often if more studies are made of the effect of drugs on such complicated phenomena as pre-operative apprehension and postoperative painthen it is time we considered both the ethics and the common sense of placebo administration. This seems especially important at a time when tragedy has brought the problem of adequate testing of new drugs into sharp focus and when the ethics of human experimentation have become the subject of a lively correspondence following the publication of Sir Austin Bradford Hill's Marc Daniels lecture (Hill 1963) .
All of us have by now got used to hearing the word placebo. If we are not careful we will soon take it for granted and forget that we never knew precisely what a placebo is or what purpose it is intended to serve. One wonders whether already some investigators have made use of placebos only because they felt sure that their work would be criticized unless they did what everyone else seemed to be doing. Perhaps we would not be setting an impossibly high standard for ourselves if we aimed at a clearer understanding of the position than this.
The Principle ofControl Since I intend to confine my remarks to the use of the placebo in the context of the controlled clinical trial, it would be as well first of all to say a word about 'control'. The principle of control, as I see it, is that of comparing what happens when a drug is given in certain circumstances with what happens when all the circumstances are identical and the drug is not given. In experimental work the frequent need for 'control' of this kind has long been apparent: to ascertain, for example, that the mere injection of a certain volume of fluid into a preparation does not produce a pressure change or other effect which might appear to be due to an active drug. In the clinical testing of drugs, although the situation is more complex and ethical considerations arise, the need for some kind of 'control' is no less real; but this fact seems only recently to have become widely recognized. James Lind (1753) made a brave beginning more than 200 years ago when he allocated patients with scurvy to several groups, as nearly comparable as possible, and treated these groups in different ways; but most physicians were slow to learn from Lind's example and some have not learned yet. Many have been the reports of tuberculous patients dancing in the corridors after a new form of treatment, of rheumatoid cripples leaping for joy when given a new drug, and of other apparently revolutionary advances which, when a well-planned trial was finally carried out, were weighed in the balance and found wanting. Dudley Hart (1958) has described how a group of arthritic patients, when subsequently confronted with what they had written during the first flush of their enthusiasm for a new remedy, said they 'must have been mad at the time to have written such stuff'. It is perhaps no surprise that Sir George Pickering should have described the controlled therapeutic trial as the most important medical development of the past ten years (Wolf 1959) .
Placebo Control and Dummy Control
A placebo, by definition, implies something given to please the patient. It would clearly be inappropriate to speak of giving a placebo to a heart-lung or a nerve-muscle preparation and, even in the intact animal, it is hard to imagine a saline injection being the cause of much enjoyment. We need know little about the work of Pavlov, however, to realize that in long-term work with an intelligent laboratory animal the possibility of placebo effects becomes very real. As we move from veterinary practice towards human practice insight and imagination have to be reckoned with; the 'patient-doctor relationship' gradually becomes all-important and a subtle change comes over our use of the 'control'. It is strange indeed how many people have believedand on what slender evidencethat the less intelligent a patient is, the more likely he is to respond to a placebo.
A placebo, then, when used in a clinical trial, cannot provide the same type of 'control' as an injection of saline given to a laboratory preparation. In the laboratory preparation the absence of psychological factors and the repeatability of the effect of a control injection provide the basis of 'control'; in the clinical trial psychological factors can never be eliminated except by general antsthesia: there is little predictability and even less repeatability about a patient's response to a placebo.
Some workers have chosen to speak of a 'dummy' injection or a 'saline control' rather than a placebo. Can any valid distinction be made, in a clinical trial, between the placebo and the 'dummy'? Gaddum (1954) considered 'dummy' the right word to 'describe a form of treatment intended to have no effect', while a 'placebo is something which is intended to act through a psychological mechanism', yet in the same paper he referred to a clinical trial in which, since 'dummy' tablets were effective in about 40% of cases, the authors concluded that the good effects observed by others had been partly due to suggestion: it seems that Gaddum was prepared to attribute psychological effects, after all, to the 'dummy'. Similarly, Glaser (1959) said 'a placebo is given with the intention of producing a definite psychological effect. A dunmy is given in order to prevent any differences between the psychological effects of treatment and lack of treatment'. This clearly implies that treatment, even with a 'dummy', has a psychological effect, and thus the 'dummy' cannot be so different from the placebo. Although, according to Glaser's view, it is the placebo that is given with the intention of producing a psychological effect, the dummy, although given with the best intentions in the world, may do the same. Indeed, no drug can be given to a patient without some psychological consequence and I can see little to be gained by pursuing the distinction between placebos and dummies.
New Treatment and No Treatment
An apparently simple form of 'control' is to compare the effect of treatment with that of no treatment.
We all realize that some knowledge of what Ryle described as 'the natural history of disease' is needed in order to understand the real influence of therapeutic measures. By comparing the effect of treatment with the effect of no treatment we can go some way towards answering the age-old question which Gall posed at the beginning of the last century: 'What is Nature's share and what is medicine's in the healing of disease?' (Wolf 1959) . Treatment, in this context, can be variously interpreted: if we are primarily interested in the influence of a drug we will naturally arrange for groups of patients to be looked after in exactly the same way except that some receive the drug while others do not. On the other hand, if we are primarily interested in the influence of the hospital environment, the doctors' enthusiasm, or the attitude of the nursing staff, these are the factors that we shall attempt to vary. I mention this because it is of great importance to realize that 'placebo' effects are not confined to the use of drugs. Wolf (1959) wrote: 'Edward Trudeau had gone up to his favourite haunt in the Adirondack mountains to die of tuberculosis. When, instead, he recovered, he attributed his conquest of tuberculosis to the mountain air and thereby fostered a placebo ritual which long out-lived him.' The sanatorium treatment of tuberculosis is perhaps the best of all examples of a situation where a 'placebo control' is inherently available without recourse to injections: when the Medical Research Council made its classical trial of streptomycin in pulmonary tuberculosis the 'control' patients were given no injections rather than repeated injections of saline, and Bradford Hill (1963) has recently stated that he would still regard this as the appropriate procedure.
Perhaps I may remind you, in this context, that in Chaucer's 'Merchant's Tale' the principal character, Old January, has a brothera notable flattererwho is named Placebo. Among the many parts which each physician plays in his. time upon the stage of medicine, Placebo is no minor role. Interestingly enough, those physicians who most self-righteously refuse to allow placebos to be given to their patients are very often the ones who, with adroit evasions and reassurances, play Placebo to perfection! Truly we deceive ourselves if we imagine that we can eliminate placebo effects by avoiding injections of saline.
New Treatment and the Placebo If a new form of treatment is compared with a placebo, rather than with nothing, a step forward can sometimes be taken in assessing the influence of psychological factors in recovery or relief of symptoms. Crudely expressed, we might say that if a difference can be demonstrated between the results of treatment and the results of no treatment this tells us that the treatment is having an effect; if a placebo is less effective than the active drug but more effective than nothing at all this tells us that the response to treatment, in a group of patients, is partly psychological and partly 'specific'. This resultthe placebo lying somewhere between the active drug and nothing at allis what most people expect to find but it does not invariably occur. In some circumstances a placebo is no better than nothing at all; in others it is apparently more effective than the drug under trial; sometimes it seems actually to work in the opposite direction (Lasagna 1955a , Modell & Garrett 1960 . One of the first things to be realized, therefore, before embarking lightheartedly upon the use of a placebo is that far from clarifying the issue it may merely add confusion.
Another aspect ofplacebo administration which is frequently overlooked is that the placebo does not hold an exclusive right to placebo effects. Every active drug is a potential placebo as well. This is of special importance in studying individual patients rather than groups: if I give a patient an injection ofnormal saline and it relieves his pain I know that this result is not due to any specific pharmacological action; but if I give him an injection of morphine and it relieves his pain I know nothing of the kind, for an injection of morphine is certainly no less likely to have a psychological effect than an injection of saline.
Ethics and Common Sense
The ethical aspects of placebo administration often depend on the issues at stake. Sometimes, in work relating to anesthetics, only a modest step forward can be expected at best; no major advance in the treatment of disease will result from the study of premedication or post-operative pain. Since we have drugs at our disposal which are fairly satisfactory it is doubly important that our first concern should be to do the patient no harm. Clearly we cannot close our eyes to the possibility of finding better drugs and improved methods of management, but we must take particular care that the quest for these involves no danger or serious discomfort to the patient.
We felt that when we used a placebo in the study of post-operative pain we were doing no great harm because, if the patient remained unrelieved after fifteen to twenty minutes, an active drug was given. The situation would be a little different in the case of a premedication study; if a placebo is given and the patient remains apprehensive the hour of surgery is already at hand. It might be accepted at the outset of such a trial, with the surgeons' co-operation, that certain operations may have to be postponed but, even so, one might legitimately wonder whether it is justifiable to run the risk of upsetting a patient at such an important time. Before taking the risk one should at least have a clear idea of what is potentially to be gained. The giving of a placebo may provide a useful means of measuring the purely psychological effects of premedication as opposed to the specific effects of any active drug; but what are we to do if we find that a placebo is almost as effective as an active drug? This would not mean that 'premedication' is unnecessary: it would simply demonstrate the importance of giving the patient an injection of some kind. But would we then prescribe placebos as a routine, as being the least toxic agents likely to help the patient? It might be said, with some justification, that even today many robust patients are premedicated with doses of morphine so small that the best to be said of them is that at least they do no harm. But I think we all accept the fact that a large part of the value of premedication is psychological, and I cannot see that our practice would be greatly influenced by a placebo study. Cabot, in 1906, said: 'Every placebo is a lie, and sooner or later the lie is found out.' All doctors are at some time concerned about the ethics of deceiving a patient, and many feel most reluctant to resort to the deliberate administration of a pharmacologically -worthless substance. Again, however, I see no fundamental difference between lying with drugs and lying by word of mouth. I suggest that no doctor hesitates to lie to a patient if he honestly feels that it will help him: how many times in his career does Dr Placebo say 'don't worry, you are going to be all right' in the face of the most terrible disease. In a clinical trial it may genuinely be felt that some patients will derive benefit, albeit psychological, from the; administration of a placebo; more often, the situation being neutral as regards death or recovery, it is felt that placebo administration will yield valuable information while doing the patient no harm. In either case I would not be deterred from using a placebo on ethical grounds, although as I have just indicatedthe interpretation of what constitutes gaining valuable information and what constitutes doing harm to a patient requires considerable care.
Arising out of this ethical discussion is the question of whether it is necessary, or even advisable, to explain the circumstances of a clinical trial to each patient and obtain his consent before administering a placebo. I believe there are some situations in which a trial would be entirely invalidated by any attempt to explain it to the patientand I would put our post-operative pain study in this category. Very much more often I think it is impossible for the patient to understand the full implications of what he is being told. The situation is not unlike that which arises when a patient's consent is obtained for a routine surgical operation; this is done as a formality, there being no pretence to try and make the patient realize that he has a 5 % chance of dying and a 10 % chance of developing a particular complication. Furthermore, since there is no universal agreement as to the 'correct' operative procedure or the 'right' drug in any given situation, every surgical operation and every administration of a drug is to some extent a clinical experiment. It might well be said that the only thing which distinguishes a controlled trial is that the physician has more insight into the extent to which he is experimenting on the patient and is more likely to make good use of his observations. It is important to realize how very arbitrary are the terms of reference. recently made this clear:
'When does the clinical trial of a new treatment end? If, on the basis of a report on 10 cases, Dr A decides to carry out a controlled clinical trial on patients, then obviously he will have to explain to each patient that he may be giving them a new treatment and obtain their consent. In contrast with this, Dr B, whose judgment is perhaps less than his enthusiasm, decides that the report on 10 cases is good enough and therefore gives the new treatment to his next 100 patients. Apparently he is under no obligation to explain to them the situation or to obtain their consent. The rule would therefore appear to penalize the cautious physician rather than the incautious one, and the one with ethical scruples rather than the one lacking them.
'If Dr C decides to try out a new treatment on 20 patients, then he must explain the situation to them carefully and obtain their consent. Apparently it is not necessary to do so for his 21st patient and he can then go ahead without bothering, but if he should not explain to the 20th patient what he is doing, he is committing a serious ethical offence. Dr D decided that 19 patients would be quite suitable, so the same action on his part for his twentieth case does not constitute an ethical offence.' I share Sir Austin Bradford Hill's (1963) view that it is impossible to establish any arbitrary rule about whether or not it is right to use a placebo or necessary to obtain the patient's consent: 'The ethical decision still lies with the doctor, whether or not it is proper to exhibit, or withhold, treatment. He cannot divest himself of it simply by means of an illusory or uncomprehending consent.' New Treatment and Old Treatment When a generally accepted form of treatment is available, such as morphine for the relief of pain, this can be used as a standard of comparison for a new drug. It has sometimes been stated, quite categorically, that a properly planned clinical trial involves the comparison of a new agent with both a placebo and a standard alternative form of treatment. I have never seen the reasons for this belief clearly set out and I certainly do not subscribe to it. There are many clinical situations in which we are primarily interested in whether a new drug has any advantage to offer the patient; unless it has there is no point wasting time trying to decide whether its effect is mainly 'psychological' or mainly 'specific'. We are usually prepared to acknowledge that both the new drug and the standard alternative will produce some psychological effect and we may reasonably assume that these effects will be of comparable magnitude. It is important, though, that the value of the standard treatment should be well established; to use a fairly new tranquillizer as the standard of comparison for an even newer tranquillizer in a psychiatric study, for example, would carry far less conviction than the use of morphine as the standard in a study of pain.
From the practical point of view there is everything to be gained by using an active drug as a standard of comparison in preference to a placebo. Suppose we are investigating an analgesic drug: we can imagine that we begin with a scale of relief on which there are two points, representing the efficacy of a placebo and of morphine. The problem is to find whereabouts on the scale the new drug lies in relation to these two points. It may be nearer to the placebo than to morphine or it may be nearer to morphine than to the placebo. We can make a clinical trial in which we compare the new drug with a placebo, or one in which we compare it with morphine. If the drug is near the placebo and we choose to compare it with a placebo we shall need a very large series of cases to show a statistically significant difference; this means that we must inflict both the drug and the placebo on many patients before we dismiss the drug as worthless, and this is clearly an undesirable kind of trial. If we had chosen to compare the drug with morphine we could have rejected it almost immediately since its marked inferiority would have become apparent when a few cases had been treated. If the drug is nearer morphine than the placebo and we compare it with a placebo, we shall soon be tempted to make wildly enthusiastic claims. But if we compare it with morphine it is not long before we see that it has no outstanding advantage. Even if the new drug is far superior to morphine we are much more interested in measuring this superiority than in showing how much better it is than a placebo. If every introducer of a new analgesic drug were to begin by asking himself the simple question 'how much better is this drug than morphine' I suspect that we should be spared the reading of a great many eulogies.
The Blind and the Double Blind
Having considered some of the alternatives that are available for comparison in a controlled trial, I should like to say a word about the 'doubleblind' technique which is so closely bound up in most people's minds with the use of placebos. I think that as a means of eliminating bias the introduction of double-blind techniques, in which neither the patient nor the investigator knows which of two agents is being given on any occasion, has been a great advance. But I think we should not tie ourselves any more slavishly to them than to the placebo itself. Several voices have recently taken up the query as to whether a double-blind method is always necessary and whether it is reasonable deliberately to deprive the doctor of information which may help him to use his judgment and experience. Furthermore, the use of a double-blind method is not a fool-proof mechanical means of ensuring that a correct interpretation is placed on results. Such extreme measures have occasionally been taken that things threaten to get out of hand; Modell (1959) , citing some examples of triple and even fivefold blind studies, remarked 'it would seem that the fascinating notion is developing that if there is sufficient blindness it will ultimately lead to some sort of occult vision'. Letemendia & Harris (1959) have published a critical analysis of the problem of distortion in double-blind trials. They point out that because there is scope for the operation of prejudice it does not follow that prejudice will necessarily be shown. Conversely, even in a double-blind study the investigators cannot be prevented from making guesses, and then there are three possibilities: they may guess correctly every time, in which case the double-blind procedure is useless; the guesses may be distributed at random, which is the only condition that makes a double-blind procedure valid; or they may guess either more correctly or more incorrectly than would be expected by chance, which will invalidate the double-blind study to a greater or lesser extent depending on the degree ofdeparture from chance.
It is important to realize these potential limitations in relation to each individual trial The need for 'double-blindness' and the ease of achieving it depend on the circumstances. In some situations the double-blind technique is scarcely applicable at all: to quote Modell again 'how could one use the double-blind control in a study comparing a general anaesthetic and a placebo?'. An attempt was once made to substitute nitrogen/oxygen mixtures for nitrous oxide/oxygen mixtures in dental anesthesia; the difference, I understand, was soon noticeable, and this is no great surprisefor keen as I am to extol the virtues of air, I have never included narcotic activity among its magical properties.
Reactors and Non-Reactors
The expression 'placebo reactor' has become firmly established in the language of clinical trials. An understanding of what this expression meansor is supposed to meanis no less important than an understanding of the function of the placebo itself. A study of headache was made by Jellinek in 1946, in which a placebo was used. Some of the subjects fairly consistently obtained relief of headache from the placebo; others never or hardly ever did; very few fell between these two groups. It seemed to Jellinek, therefore, that the subjects who obtained relief from a placebo could be designated 'placebo reactors'. It should be placed on record that Jellinek thought the difference in placebo response must result from a difference in the type of headache; he went even further and suggested that the reaction to a placebo might conveniently be used to differentiate real headaches from 'imaginary' ones, but the precise difference between a real and an imaginary pain in the head was not explained.
In seeking for 'placebo reactors' everything depends on the crucial distinction between relief of symptoms and lack of relief. A 'placebo reactor', by definition, is a person who obtains relief from a placebo; but not all situations are as clear-cut as the case of the headache which either goes or remains. In most clinical trials almost any degree of improvement is possible. In our own studies of post-operative pain (Parkhouse & Holmes 1963), for example, we soon found, as would be expected, that morphine did not cause the patient's pain to disappear entirely; it merely reduced its intensity to a varying extent. Changes in pain intensity were also observed after placebo administration and we gave much thought to the problem of grading pain and measuring its alleviation. Table 1 is compiled from our studies of pain after upper abdominal surgery. If we take an improvement of one or more arbitrary grades of pain to mean 'relief' we find that 85 % of our patients were relieved by morphine and 45 % by saline. According to this criterion 45% of our patients were 'placebo reactors'. But if we require an improvement of two or more arbitrary grades (Table 2) , before deeming the patient to be Table 2 Patients improved by two grades or more (pain at rest) (Table 3) , Table 3 Patients improved at rest and on movement and coughing One grade or more Two grades or more Morphine 85 ' 42/% Saline 50 % = Placebo reactors 9 %= Placebo reactors the numbers of 'placebo reactors' became rather different. If we regard an improvement in vital capacity (Table 4 ) as evidence of pain relief, the number of 'placebo reactors' was 31 % and if we look for an improved peak expiratory flow rate, it was 17 %. This is all very simple but I mention it because, frankly, I think it is important. Since Jellinek wrote his paper many people have pointed out that the incidence of 'placebo reactors' can vary from one trial to another and Table 4 Objective improvement Vital capacity Peak expiratoryflow rate Morphine 81% 31% Saline 31 % =Placebo reactors 17 % =Placebo reactors that this incidence will be influenced by the personality of the patients, the attitude of the investigator, and the nature of the phenomenon under investigation. But it seems to me that this overlooks a key point: the whole existence of the 'placebo reactor' depends on nothing more than an arbitrary decision to call some people 'relieved' and others 'not relieved'. In our own work, in which various criteria of relief were entertained, the number of 'placebo reactors' could have been reported as anything from 0 to 50 % of our patients. One might as well have said that the number of 'morphine non-reactors' varied from 15% to 92%. The truth is that the 'placebo reactor' is a mythical figure created by the investigator's arbitrary establishment of a dividing line at some point along a naturaUy smooth curve of biological variation (Parkhouse 1963) .
Mythical figures are not without their usefulness but the danger of this one is that an impression is often formed that certain people in the community can be picked out as 'placebo reactors'. Attempts have been made to define the characteristic personality of the 'placebo reactor' (Lasagna 1955b) ; it has even been maintained that in any well-conducted clinical trial 'placebo reactors' must first be identified and excluded so that they will not interfere with the validity of the results. It seems to me that this practice would result in studying the effect of drugs on only a very highly selected section of the population; indeed, rigidly applied, it might well result in having no patients left in the trial at all! I can only say that of the possibilities open to us I am glad that we chose to exclude 0 %' rather than 50 % of our patients.
Indications and Reservations
Perhaps I should now summarize my views about the use of placebos in controlled clinical trials, particularly those relating to anisthetics. As fits the occasion my remarks will, I think, on the whole be soothing.
The two classical situations in which a placebo can be of real value are where a new drug is tested in a condition for which there has previously been no effective treatment, and where it is of paramount importance to distinguish psychological effects of treatment from purely pharmacological effects. My earlier remarks will have suggested, however, that I feel some reservations about each of these indications: it is not always necessary to compare a new drug with a placebo, rather than with nothing at all, even when there is no standard alternative form of treatment; also, although the placebo may be useful in distinguishing psychological from pharmacological effects in a group of patients, it is not of great value in the individual case unless the two types of injection are to be given alternately. In any case, I can think of few situations relevant to clinical anesthesia in which either of these indications can be said to exist.
A third use for the placebo, which it would be unfair to Dr Holmes and myself not to mention, is in the comparison of different methods of drug assessment. By setting a drug with a known painrelieving effect against a drug known to have no such effect we were able to go some way towards ascertaining the best means of comparing drugs used to treat post-operative pain. I believe that this is a perfectly valid reason for giving a placebo to a limited number of patients, and it is one to which perhaps insufficient attention has been paid. I think that whenever a controlled clinical trial is planned it is worth while giving serious thought to the question of whether the use of a placebo will provide valuable information, whether it will merely confuse the issue and whether we are likely to be influenced in our choice of drugs by the knowledge of what a placebo can do. I think it will then sometimes be considered advisable to incorporate a placebo in the trial, but perhaps not very often; if we go about things in this way, with due regard for the comfort and well-being of the patient, we need not be seriously worried by ethical objections. And, to paraphrase the words of Sir Walter Scott, 'With this placebo I conclude my note'. The function of the placebo is to measure the psychological response on the part of the patients when drugs are being administered in a clinical trial. The dummy is for the observer to eliminate his potential bias during the course of his measurements (Witts 1960) . The functions of the placebo and the dummy often overlap, especially when the parameter being measured contains a large subjective element, e.g. pain.
In any trial of an analgesic involving patients in pain there is likely to be a shifting base-line in terms of the pain experienced and the patient's response to the pain (Beecher 1956). Therefore the placebo response must be determined at the same time and under the same conditions as when the drug is being measured (Beecher 1957).
In any analgesic trial the unknown must be compared with both a placebo and a standard analgesic. Should the unknown be near the placebo it may well take a large clinical trial to measure its strength. The fact that the unknown may be clinically worthless is irrelevant to the pharmacological study undertaken.
Direct comparison with a standard without determining the placebo response may lead to wrong conclusions. This is shown by some work in which I tried to compare the analgesic properties of Pethilorfan with pethidine using a doubleblind technique. The method of measurement was graded pressure on the tibia (Dundee & Moore 1960) . The results could not distinguish between the two drugs, from which it may be concluded that the two drugs were equipotent analgesics. However, the placebo could not be distinguished from the standard either. Thus another important function of the placebo is to check on the experimental technique. If the placebo cannot be differentiated from the standard then the experimental technique fails. Dr question: 'When does a clinical trial end?' can perhaps be answered as follows:
Dr A is verifying the initial report. Dr B is not doing a controlled clinical trial but merely taking a chance that the new treatment might work. As regards Drs C and D this is a criticism of the particular techniques of analysis. The improved efficiency of any new remedy, and therefore the size of the clinical trial, cannot be predetermined.
If an economical use of patients for the trial is necessary then a refined technique of analysis, such as sequential analysis, should be used.
The ethics of explanation will depend upon whether the patient is being treated under controlled trial conditions. If the patient is merely being given the new treatment then the doctor bears the even greater ethical responsibility of using a new therapy without knowing or determining its proper effectiveness.
To summarize, I think the placebo holds an important place in any controlled clinical trial. Its functions are: (1) To determine the psychological response to the therapy. (2) To determine whether this psychological response is changing.
(3) To check on the validity of the experimental technique.
